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HOW SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
CAN CONTRIBUTE TO EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION?
The author wants to discuss how the dynamics of global value chains and the implementation of the 
concept of Supply Chain Management impact the process of European Integration. Not only the Economic 
Integration. He wants to explicate that and how this impact goes further into the domains of social and 
even cultural integration. While Value Chain research has a strong economic focus, including international 
trade and developing countries issues (Kaplinsky, 2004), Supply Chain Management, SCM is focused on 
the individual company level, vertical co-operation and corporate strategy. Both perspectives are 
inseparably intertwined. However, with the following reflections he wants to emphasise the inter-company 
perspective of SCM. In explicating the conceptual alternatives of SCM, SC Governance and their 
dynamics in a general way, he wants to lay the groundwork for the final conclusions regarding the 
potential impacts of SCM on European Integration.*
European integration and European cooperation is 
very high on the political agenda in most European 
countries. The European question is already deeply 
imbedded in our public life, in our culture and in our 
everyday life. The strong emotional reactions pro and 
against questions of European integration and to 
globalisation as such are however an indication of 
existing challenges and problems. We still live and 
think very much as local and national citizens and not 
as European and global citizens. Globalisation of 
supply chains has taken place, but we still see the 
global environment from our national and local 
perspective. This makes the project of European 
integration complex. The discussion about 
opportunities and risks of going European has gained 
new intensity through the current debate about the 
European constitution and the situation in the recently 
enlarged European Union, facing further enlargement 
in the future.
Most of the expectations regarding the benefits of 
integration have always been based on the concept of 
an open European market. However, such expectations
have also always been contrasted by the reluctance 
against EU bureaucracy and centralism, which is fully 
understandable in the light of European diversity. 
Against this background the EU Summit at Lisbon in 
March 2000 was an important mark on the way to a 
deeper European integration. EU prime ministers 
announced the adoption of 'a new open method of co­
ordination', which is based on benchmarking and 
spreading best practice. It is intended to help member- 
states converge towards common objectives in areas 
such as employment, economic reform and social 
cohesion. It is supposed to enable member-states to 
co-operate closely, yet recognises their diversity and 
avoids forced harmonisation and allows for a 
concerted EU approach while leaving legal 
competence and authority with the individual member- 
states. (Goetschy, 2003; Hughes, 2000/1).
It remains to be seen whether open co-ordination 
can boost the EU's progress towards a competitive,
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knowledge-based economy. But it is a fact that this 
method has allowed the EU to extend the concept of 
joint action into new policy areas. The OMC provides 
a fully decentralized approach in line with the 
Principle of Subsidiarity (Calliess, 1999) in which the 
Union, the Members States, the regional and local 
levels, as well as the social partners and the civil 
society, will be actively involved, using variable forms 
of partnership.
Focussing our analysis on the potentials of 
European Economic Integration we have to consider 
that there is a strong interrelationship between national 
or regional and private company related issues in the 
EU, and to discuss economic and business issues in the 
EU context has to take into account the fact that 
European markets develop as part of the bigger global 
economy and market trends. (Baldwin -  Wyplosz, 
2004; Döhrn, 1998/9; Faust -  Voßkamp -  Wittke, 
2004; Potratz -  Widmaier, 1998/9; Ruiz Jimenez et al., 
2004).
Supply Chain Management:
An approach to integrate (global) value chains
A supply chain is commonly regarded as a multi­
level sequence of material suppliers, production 
facilities, distribution services and customers which 
are linked together by the flow of goods and 
information (Towill -  Naim -  Wikner, 1992). And 
Supply Chain Management aims at the systemic, 
strategic coordination of the whole SC (Mentzer et al.,
2001). In the global context SC Integration can even 
be seen as the main distinction between 
internationalisation and globalisation (Dicken, 1999). 
Simplified we can say that SCM configuration and 
coordination of vertical value chains, especially their 
vertical integration versus disintegration on the 
strategic as well as the operative level. In other words: 
The fundamental question of SCM is: What are the key 
influence factors and alternatives for SC Governance? 
Which are the general principles for the organisation 
and coordination of vertical value chains? And who are 
the governors conducting that? (Figure 1.)
Regarding these key questions some general 
characteristics of a common (“orthodox”) vision have 
begun to appear over the last years with all signs 
pointing to a supply chain built around compressed 
cycle times, increased information flows and focal 
control by the most powerful actor in the chain 
( “dominated SC”) (Jackson -  Winkler). However, this 
view of the supply chain's future may be „utopian”. Is 
the idea of planning across the extended enterprise 
akin to the dreams of totally planned economies? Will 
supply chains ever be able to function as harmonious, 
unified entities? Companies may give lip service to the 
idea of shared goals and shared profit, but ultimately 
they will behave independently, in their own perceived 
best interests and in pursuit of their own goals. For 
example companies may not be willing to share 
information that they view as potentially giving them 
some competitive advantage.
Facing these challenges a different approach has 
been proposed only recently. This does not mean to
Figure 1:
Generic Supply Chain. Source: Delfmann, W. (1998)
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give up the idea of SC integration. But the approach 
follows a different paradigm. Interestingly enough this 
concept is fully in line with the above mentioned OMC 
on the political level. A „federated SC” is a system in 
which each member continues to act independently in 
pursuit of its own goals and on behalf of its own 
shareholders, much like members of a political 
federation pursue their own policies on behalf of their 
citizens (Reese, 2001; Ulrich; Zuboff -  Maxmin,
2002). Through ongoing dialog, supply chain partners 
can understand critical constraints and cost drivers in 
the supply network and achieve agreement on perfor­
mance levels, incentives, rules and boundaries. These 
boundaries define supply policies and targets and 
govern the flow of information across organizations.
Advocates of the federated model assert that it is 
less complex and more efficient than the „utopian 
approach.” Over time, the theory goes, supply chains 
will become increasingly efficient as companies swap 
trading partners in response to perceived potential 
gains in efficiency or to changes in market conditions. 
The federated approach also allows companies to think 
about how they can change existing products to take 
advantage of new technologies or new suppliers that 
offer innovative ways to solve a design problem in an 
existing product, since this model provides for the 
relatively easy switching of suppliers in and out of a 
supply chain. But -  as on the political stage we can 
ask: Is this another utopian idea -  only on the other 
side of the scale? Obviously there is no simple answer. 
What we have to understand is the contingencies under 
which different forms of supply chain governance can 
be appropriate (Gereffi -  Humphrey -  Sturgeon, 2004; 
Palpacuer, 2000).
The scope of SC Governance:
Between Markets and Hierarchies
Two of the most important features of the 
contemporary economy are the globalization of 
production and trade, and the vertical disintegration of 
trans-national corporations, which are redefining their 
core competencies. They focus on innovation and 
product strategy, and the highest value added segments 
of manufacturing and services, while reducing their 
direct ownership over „non-core” functions such as 
generic services and volume production (UNIDO, 
2002/3). Together, these two shifts have laid the 
groundwork for a variety of network forms of 
governance situated between arm’s length markets, on
the one hand, and large vertically integrated 
corporations, on the other. The evolution of global- 
scale industrial organization affects not only the 
fortunes of firms and the structure of industries, but 
also how and why countries advance — or fail to 
advance — in the global economy. Global value chain 
research examines the different ways in which global 
production and-distribution systems are integrated, and 
the possibilities for firms -  and countries -  to enhance 
their position in global markets (Wood, 2001).
Production in different countries leads to cross- 
border production networks within or between firms. 
This „disintegration of production” in the global 
economy has led to a growing proportion of 
international trade occurring in components and other 
intermediate goods. There is a broad theoretical basis 
for the development of a range of vertical network-like 
arrangements. They can be explained from a 
Transaction Cost Perspective (Williamson, 1975) and 
through Network Theory (Thorelli, 1986); Jarillo 
(1988); Powell (1990) as well as through literature on 
Firm Capabilities (Penrose, 1959) and Organisational 
Learning and the Concept of Core Competences 
(Prahalad -  Hamel, 1990). These considerations lead 
to a differentiated typology of value-chain governance. 
And we can explicate under which conditions different 
types of global value chain governance should arise by 
analysing three key determinants of value chain 
governance patterns: complexity o f transactions, 
codification of information and capability of supplier. 
These three factors directly impact the choice of value 
chain governance. We can briefly distinguish five 
types of governance (Gereffi -  Humphrey -  Sturgeon, 
2003, 4ff) (Figure 2):
1. Market linkages do not have to be completely 
transitory, as is typical of spot markets; they can 
persist over time, with repeated transactions. The 
essential point is that the costs of switching to new 
partners are low for both parties.
When transactions are easily codified, product 
specifications are relatively simple, and suppliers 
have the capability to make the products in 
question with little input from buyers, asset 
specificity will fail to accumulate and market 
governance can be expected. Buyers respond to 
specifications and prices set by sellers. Because the 
complexity of information exchanged is relatively 
low, transactions can be governed with little 
explicit coordination.
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Figure2:
Types of Supply Chain Governance. Source: Gereffi -  Humphrey -  Sturgeon (2003: 9.p.)
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2. Typically, suppliers in Modular value chains make 
products to a customer's specifications, which may 
be more or less detailed. However, „turn-key 
services” suppliers take full responsibility for 
competencies surrounding process technology, use 
generic machinery that limits transaction specific 
investments, and make capital outlays for 
components and materials on behalf of customers. 
When the ability to codify specifications extends to 
complex products, value chain modularity can 
arise. This can come about when product 
architecture is modular and technical standards 
simplify interactions by reducing component 
variation and by unifying component, product, and 
process specifications. Because of codification, 
complex information can be exchanged with little 
explicit coordination, and the cost of switching to 
new partners remains low.
3. In Relational value chains' vie, see complex 
interactions between buyers and sellers, which 
often create mutual dependence and high levels of 
asset specificity. This may be managed through 
reputation, or social ties. The role of spatial 
proximity in supporting relational value chain 
linkages can be highlighted, but trust and reputation 
might well function in spatially dispersed networks 
where relationships are built-up over time or are 
based on dispersed social groups.
When product specifications cannot be codified, 
transactions are complex, and supplier capabilities 
are high, relational value chain governance can be 
expected. This is because tacit knowledge must be 
exchanged between buyers and sellers, and because 
highly competent suppliers provide a strong 
motivation for lead firms to outsource to gain 
access to complementary competencies. The 
mutual dependence can also be handled through 
credible commitments. The exchange of complex 
tacit information is accomplished by frequent 
interaction and governed by high levels of explicit 
coordination, which makes the costs of switching to 
new partners high.
4. In Captive value chains small suppliers are 
dependent on much larger buyers. They face 
significant switching costs and are, therefore, 
"captive". Such networks are frequently 
characterized by a high degree of monitoring and 
control by lead firms.
When the ability to codify — in the form of 
detailed instructions — and the complexity of 
product specifications are both high but supplier 
capabilities are low, then value chain governance 
will tend toward this captive type. This is because 
low supplier competence in the face of complex 
products and specifications requires a great deal of 
intervention and control on the part of the lead firm
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which seeks to lock-in suppliers in order to exclude 
others from reaping the benefits of their efforts. 
Captive suppliers are frequently confined to a 
narrow range of tasks and are dependent on the lead 
firm for complementary activities such as design, 
component purchasing, and process technology 
upgrading. Captive inter-firm linkages control 
opportunism through the dominance of lead firms, 
while at the same time providing enough resources 
and market access to the subordinate firms to make 
exit an unattractive option.
5. Hierarchy is characterized by vertical integration. 
The dominant form of governance is managerial 
control, flowing from headquarters to subsidiaries 
and affiliates.
When product specifications cannot be codified, 
products are complex, and highly competent 
suppliers cannot be found, then lead firms will be 
forced to develop and manufacture products in- 
house -  in the international setting this leads to 
Foreign Direct Investment. This governance form 
is usually driven by the need to exchange tacit 
knowledge between value chain activities as well 
as the need to effectively manage complex webs of 
inputs and outputs and to control resources, 
especially intellectual property. (Figure 3)
Each of these 5 governance types provides a 
different trade-off between the benefits and risks of 
vertical (dis-) integration. They comprise a 
spectrum running from low levels of explicit 
coordination and power asymmetry between buyers 
and suppliers, in the case of markets, to high levels 
of explicit coordination and power asymmetry 
between buyers and suppliers, in the case of 
hierarchy. The fact that the governance types
developed here can be used to illuminate how power 
operates in global value chains merits elaboration. 
Coming back to the controversial concepts of SCM 
mentioned above we can state that the underlying 
logic of SC Governance reaches from a more or less 
disintegrated SC in the cases of Markets and 
Modular SC to the Dominated SC in the cases of 
captive and, -of course, hierarchy types. However, 
the most interesting governance type seems to be the 
relational SC, because here we see the Federated SC 
concept applied. Here, the power balance between 
the firms is more symmetrical, given that both 
contribute key competences. A great deal of explicit 
coordination is achieved through a close dialogue 
between more or less equal partners (Reese, 2001; 
Ulrich). We come back to this issue soon.
Opportunities and risks of SC Dynamics: 
Upgrading as prerequisite for sustainable SC 
relations
Value chain configuration and governance are not static 
or strictly associated with particular industries. The 
supply chain train keeps on rolling continuously. And 
there are many examples proving especially that compa­
nies -  and regions or countries -  mainly relying on low 
labour-cost could only temporarily profit from such an 
advantage. One such case is Mexico, which has lost its 
low cost position regarding the US market to South East 
Asian countries and not really built up a sustainable 
competitive position based on capabilities. And this is of 
course also a major risk for European companies, where 
the low cost train will be rolling further to the East. 
Ireland, on the other side, is an excellent example of a 
country which has successfully upgraded its position in 
international value chains significantly.
Figure 3:
Characterictics of Supply Chain Governance Types.
Governance
Type
Complexity of 
transactions
Ability to codify 
transactions
Capabilities in 
the supply-base
Degree of explicit 
coordination and 
power asymmetry
Market Low High High Low
Modular High High High i 1
Relational High Low High
Captive High High Low
1f
Hierarchy High Low Low High
Source: Gereffi -  Humphrey -  Sturgeon (2003: 8.p.)
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Figure 4:
Dynamics of Supply Chain Governance
Governance
Type
Complexity of 
transactions
Ability to codify 
transactions
Capabilities in 
the supply-base
Market Low High High
Modular m High [2ji A High [4] 1 a High a
Relational High m i  low t m l  High [6] 1
Captive
■ -  i
' High High Low
Hierarchy High Low Low
Source: Gereffi -  Humphrey -  Sturgeon (2003: ll.p.)
Generally speaking this dynamism and variation 
can largely be accounted for by the three explanatory 
variables presented before (Gerefft -  Humphrey -  
Sturgeon, 2003: ll.p.). First, information complexity 
changes as lead firms seek to obtain more complex 
outputs and services from their supply-base. This can 
reduce the effective level of supplier capabilities as 
existing capabilities may not meet the new 
requirements (trajectory number 1 in figure 4). 
Alternatively, reduced complexity may increase the 
ability to codify transactions (trajectory 2 in figure 4). 
Second, within industries there is a continuing tension 
between codification and innovation (trajectories 
number 3 and 4 in figure 4). New technologies can 
restart the clock on the process of codification. Third, 
supplier competence changes over time: increasing as 
suppliers learn, but falling again as buyers introduce 
new suppliers into the value chain, as new 
technologies come on-stream, or as lead firms increase 
the requirements for existing suppliers (trajectories 
number 5 and 6 in figure 4).
Increasing capabilities in the supply-base helps to 
push the architecture of global value chains away from 
hierarchy and captive networks and toward the 
relational, modular, and market types.
Value chain modularity seems to be especially 
likely when suppliers offer lead firms greater levels of 
value chain bundling (e.g., tum-key and full-package 
services), which has the advantages of internalizing 
tacit knowledge and pooling capacity utilization for 
greater economies of scale. As standards, information 
technology, and the capabilities of suppliers improve, 
the modular form appears to be playing an increasingly 
central role in the global economy. When we take 
relational networks as our starting point, however, a 
shift to modular -  and perhaps eventually to market -
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forms can be expected as standards and 
codification schemes improve because 
more fluid value chains offer additional 
decreases in cost and risk. Still there is 
clearly no single best way to organize 
global value chains.
The global value chains framework 
focuses on the nature and content of the 
inter-firm linkages, and the power that 
regulates value chain coordination. 
Furthermore, in spite of the fact that value 
chains span international borderlines, local 
and national structures and institutions 
also matter. Local industrial agglomera­
tions support organisationally disaggregated, and often 
highly innovative, economic activities and the spatial 
embeddedness of tacit knowledge and the importance 
of tight interdependencies between geographically 
clustered firms have to be stressed. These variations 
can and do have profound effects on value chain 
governance. Now: The key issue arising from this 
analysis is how producers -  whether firms, regions or 
countries -should or can participate in global value 
chains. There are two paths of insertion. The low road 
is one of immiserizing growth, a trajectory in which 
producers face intense competition and are engaged in 
a „race to the bottom”. By contrast, those who exhibit 
the ability to enter a virtuous circle of participation in 
the global economy may realize more sustained 
income growth.
What explains the difference between these two 
paths is the capability to innovate, and to ensure 
continuous improvement in product and process 
development. If this is the case, then the emphasis 
needs to be placed on the ability to learn and this has 
implications not just for the productive sector itself, 
but also for the whole national system of innovation. 
Of course this capability to innovate has to be placed 
in a relative context, compared to competitors, and this 
process can be referred to as one of Upgrading 
(Kaplinsky -  Readman, 2001: 27ff; Humphrey -  
Schmitz, 2000).
The issue of upgrading ore -  more general -  of 
organisational learning -  has been addressed in recent 
years mainly by two related theories, which have 
already been mentioned. The first has focused on core 
competences (Hamel -  Pralahad, 1994; Leonard -  
Barton, 1995), the second on dynamic capabilities 
(Teece -  Pisano, 1994). The latter argues that corporate 
profitability in the long run cannot be sustained by
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control over the market (for example, through the 
adoption of quasi-monopolistic practices), but through 
the development of dynamic capabilities which arise 
as a result of the firm’s internal processes which 
facilitate learning. This relates both to the achievement 
of new product and process development, and in the 
functional reconfiguration of who does what in the 
chain as a whole. Firms can adopt four trajectories in 
pursuing the objective of upgrading, namely 
(Kaplinsky -  Readman, 2001: 30ff):
• Process upgrading: Increasing the efficiency of 
internal processes, both within individual links in 
the chain (for example, increased inventory turns, 
lower scrap), and between the links in the chain (for 
example, more frequent, smaller and on-time 
deliveries).
• Product upgrading: Introducing new products or 
improving old products faster than rivals. This 
involves changing new product development 
processes both within individual links in the value 
chain and in the relationship between different links 
of the chain.
• Functional upgrading: increasing value-added by 
changing the mix of activities conducted within the 
firm or moving the focus of activities to different 
links in the value chain (for example from 
manufacturing to design).
• Chain upgrading: moving to a new value chain (for 
example, Taiwanese firms moved from the 
manufacture of transistor radios to calculators, to 
TVs, to computer monitors, to laptops and now to 
WAP phones).
Firms are challenged to not only target a positive 
financial surplus, but to also aim to achieve minimum 
quality, environmental, and social standards which are 
becoming an increasingly important qualifying 
requirement for participation in global product 
markets and global value chains (Allen, 2004; Bank 
Jörgensen -  Nielsen; Ponte, 2004). As this is a 
dynamic development, the capacity to meet this 
changing agenda of standards is emerging as an 
increasingly important category of process upgrading. 
Understanding the interrelationship between the 
dynamics of global value chain governance, and the 
upgrading capability of companies clearly allows 
deriving useful insights for developing sustainable 
supply chain relationships.
Conclusion: Federated Value Chains 
as a contribution to European Integration
And here we come back to the issue of European 
integration on the inter-company level. What are our 
conclusions regarding the challenges and opportunities 
companies face in Europe, especially in the new 
member states of the European Union as well as in 
future accession states. How can they prepare for 
sustainable competitiveness in the light of global value 
chain dynamics and hereby gain, retain and develop 
favourable value chain positions?
Taking our analysis regarding the different types of 
value chain governance as a reference and assessing 
the respective position especially on the supplier side, 
a clear message can be derived. There are of course 
business potentials in all types of value chains, but 
when it comes to develop a sustainable position there 
is an obvious favourite: Creating conditions to 
establish relational supply chains through conti­
nuously building up capabilities and competences 
which enable companies to be equal supply chain 
partners, not easily to be exchanged, creating mutual 
benefits as well as mutual dependence. And especially 
in the European context it makes much sense to 
develop or improve such capabilities on the basis of 
the existing regional, economic, technical and cultural 
diversity in Europe. Because this is exactly the 
complementarity needed for relational Supply Chains 
and this creates the conditions to build up Federated 
Supply Chains. It allows overcoming the inherent risks 
of being locked-in under the control of a dominant 
lead-company on one side or being highly vulnerable 
and under continuous pressure in a low cost 
competition for simple, mass products on the other 
side. And clearly: the quality of integration is 
completely different. Federated supply chains have the 
character of vertical alliances (Anderson, 2000; 
Rinehart, 1992), based on voluntary co-operation of 
equal partners, acknowledging diversity and 
complementarity of capabilities and herewith creating 
additional benefits for all actors involved which could 
otherwise not be achieved.
This is obviously an optimistic model of European 
economic integration, but it is not utopian, it is 
achievable. And it is truly aiming at implementing the 
idea of a sustainable European integration -  including 
the social and cultural integration.
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